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This thesis analyzes NATO’s decisions and actions in response to the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and assesses the 
probable future role of the Alliance in combating international terrorism.  In 
September-October 2001 the United States chose to lead a coalition against the 
Al Qaida terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan instead of ceding the 
initiative to NATO. The necessity for rapid decisions and action, the military 
capabilities gap between the United States and the European allies, and the 
lessons of NATO’s air campaign in the 1999 Kosovo crisis probably led the 
United States to make this choice.  NATO’s contributions to the campaign 
against terrorism have included sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
aircraft to the United States, deploying naval forces to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and conducting preventive action against terrorist groups acting 
within or from the Balkans.  NATO’s responses to the 11 September attacks, the 
unconventional and asymmetric threat posed by international terrorism, and the 
distinct contributions that the military can make in combating terrorism support 
the main hypothesis examined in this study:  that NATO may be unable to play 
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“At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, 
in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly 
united responses.”1 
Rome Summit Declaration, 28 May 2002 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze NATO’s decisions and actions in 
response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States 
and to assess the possible future role of the Alliance in combating international 
terrorism.  
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were not the first conducted by 
foreign terrorists against targets on U.S. soil.  The differences, however, between 
the 2001 attacks and the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 include the 
results: the enormity of the death toll, owing in particular to the demolition of the 
Twin Towers.  The scale of the 11 September attacks revealed the vulnerability 
of the United States and its allies.  Nevertheless, the 1993 bombing and the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 had 
already proved that the United States could not remain safe from terrorism at 
home. 
The West European states have had much greater experience in tackling 
domestic terrorism; they have also encountered several terrorist attacks with 
international dimensions.  Examples of such attacks include the Munich Olympics 
massacre in 1972 (9 hostages killed),2 the hijacking of the Lufthansa flight to 
                                            
1 “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality.” Declaration by Heads of State and Government 
of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation (28 May 2002), available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm> (3 February 2003). 
2 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 72. 
1 
Mogadishu in 1977 (all hostages rescued),3 the attacks on the Rome and Vienna 
airports in 1985 (19 people killed),4 the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985 (1 
passenger killed),5 the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988 
(270 people killed),6 and the bombing of the French UTA flight over Chad in 1989 
(171 passengers killed).7 
The subject of this thesis is important because the 11 September attacks 
led to the first invocation and implementation of Article 5 in the history of the 
Alliance.  Moreover, at that moment the NATO allies had to react not against an 
opposing superpower or a hostile alliance of states (the contingency for which 
NATO had prepared itself for decades), but against a network of non-state actors 
with activities both external and internal to Alliance territory. 
The principle of collective defense represents the essence of NATO.  
According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, an armed attack against one ally 
will be considered as an attack against all allies and each ally will assist, 
individually and collectively, the attacked ally.  Special circumstances, however, 
led to the invocation of Article 5 in response to the 11 September attacks.  First, 
these attacks were perpetrated from abroad.  Second, the attacks were obviously 
prepared not by isolated terrorists, but by a well-organized international network.  
Third, in 1998 Osama bin Laden had already declared war on the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and their allies.  The 11 September attacks were part of a 
series of terrorist acts conducted by Al Qaida and/or other networked Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist organizations.  These included the attacks on U.S. 
military installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996 (24 people killed),8 on the 
                                            
3 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York, NY: New York University Press, 
1986), 144. 
4 Jeffrey Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism  (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 196. 
5 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 144. 
6 Ibid., 18. 
7 Ibid., 190. 
8 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar and Information-Age 
Terrorism,” in Ian O. Lesser et al. Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA and 
Washington D.C.: RAND, 1999), 61. 
2 
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (260 people killed),9 and on the 
USS Cole in 2000 (17 people killed).10  The 11 September 2001 attacks led the 
United States and its allies to the understanding that international terrorism is 
one of the greatest threats to world peace. 
NATO’s military forces are designed to achieve predominance in 
conventional warfare against conventional enemies.  For over forty years these 
forces had been developed to deter and defend against Soviet-led forces in 
Europe.  Terrorism is not, however, a traditional military tactic; it is a tactic 
employed by non-state actors (acting independently or with state sponsorship) in 
attempts to influence state policies and to achieve their desired ends.  Martha 
Crenshaw considers terrorism a “form of violent coercion, a bargaining process 
based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of overt 
military force.”11 
[T]errorism is an attractive strategy to groups of different ideological 
persuasions who challenge the state’s authority.  Groups who want 
to dramatize a cause, to demoralize the government, to gain 
popular support, to provoke regime violence, to inspire followers, or 
to dominate a wider resistance movement, who are weak vis-à-vis 
the regime, and who are impatient to act, often find terrorism a 
reasonable choice.12 
Terrorist tactics have never respected military conventions.  Terrorists are 
not conventional soldiers: they do not wear uniforms, they usually do not have 
insignia, and they do not move and fight within easily identifiable combat units.  
They could be virtually everywhere; and they could hit anywhere.  “Society as 
well as the state may be perceived as the enemy – the bourgeoisie, for example, 
or capitalism.  The enemy may even be international; multinational capitalism is 
                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Simon, xiv. 
11 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” 
in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 13. 
12 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 13:4, 1981, 379-399: 
389. 
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often a common enemy of the radical right and the radical left.”13  Victims of 
terrorism could be both politicians and ordinary citizens; both governmental and 
non-governmental targets could be attacked.  “The victims or objects of [a] 
terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a 
larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek.”14 
Contemporary terrorism is becoming more internationalized, more diverse, 
more networked, and more lethal.15  The development of air transport, 
communications, the Internet, and international banking; and the greater 
opportunities for free movement between the Schengen area member states of 
the European Union have contributed to the internationalization of terrorism. As 
Bruce Hoffman has pointed out,  
“[The] new terrorist organizations embrace far more amorphous religious 
and millenarian aims and wrap themselves in less-cohesive organizational 
entities, with a more-diffuse structure and membership.”16  John Arquilla, David 
Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini argue that “[t]errorism seems to be evolving in the 
direction of violent netwar.”17  They define netwar as “an emerging mode of 
conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in 
which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, 
strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.”18 
Terrorism’s increased lethality is a “result of a handful of so-called terrorist 
‘spectaculars’ – that is, the dramatic, attention-riveting, high-lethality acts that so 
effectively capture the attention of the media and public alike.”19  Bruce Hoffman 
suggests five reasons for terrorism’s increased lethality: 
                                            
13 Martha Crenshaw, “Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental 
Reasons,” in International Social Movement Research, ed. Donatella della Porta, vol. 4, 1992, 29-
42: 34. 
14 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 379. 
15 Ian O. Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in Ian O. Lesser 
et al. Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA and Washington D.C.: RAND, 1999), 87. 
16 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Lesser et al., 9. 
17 Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 56. 
18 Ibid., 47. 
4 
19 Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” 12. 
First, there appears to be a pattern that suggests that at least some 
terrorists have come to believe that attention is no longer as readily 
obtained as it once was.  To their minds, both the public and media 
have become increasingly inured or desensitized to the continuing 
spiral of terrorist violence.20 
Second, terrorists have profited from past experience and have 
become more adept at killing.  Not only are their weapons 
becoming smaller, more sophisticated, and deadlier, but terrorists 
have greater access to these weapons through their alliances with 
various rogue states.21 
[The] third reason for terrorism’s increased lethality, and one 
closely tied to the above point, is the active role played by states in 
supporting and sponsoring terrorism.22 
Fourth, the overall increase during the past 15 years of terrorism 
motivated by a religious imperative encapsulates the confluence of 
new adversaries, motivations, and tactics affecting terrorist patterns 
today.23 
Fifth, the proliferation of amateurs taking part in terrorist acts has 
also contributed to terrorism’s increased lethality.24 
While the intensity of political terrorism may be decreasing, that of ethnic 
and religious terrorism appears to be increasing: 
Terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s consisted largely of radical left-
wing groups in Europe and South America with definable goals – 
however unattainable.  The new breed of terrorist attacking the 
West has few aims.  They just want to kill and punish for what they 
believe is Western imperialism and the global oppression of 
Muslims. In their eyes it is guilt by association.25 
Hoffman argues that the reasons for the greater lethality of religious 
terrorism in comparison with secular forms reside in its core characteristics: 
                                            
20 Ibid., 13. 
21 Ibid., 14. 
22 Ibid., 14. 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of 
Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 4. 
5 
different value systems, concepts of morality, and mechanisms of legitimization 
and justification: 
For the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act of divine 
duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or 
imperative and justified by scripture.  Religion therefore functions 
as a legitimizing force, specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence 
against an almost open-ended category of opponents (i.e., all 
people who are not members of the religious terrorists’ religion or 
cult).26 
The 11 September attacks were shocking, surprising and sobering for all 
NATO allies.  They tested the unity and the decisiveness of the Alliance.  
Moreover, they presented a challenge to NATO’s capabilities to react rapidly with 
military force.  This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of NATO’s participation in 
the campaign against international terrorism.  The thesis also considers the 
possible role of the military in combating terrorism as a basis for its examination 
of NATO’s possible future contributions to this struggle.  
The Atlantic Alliance’s solidarity and the perception of a common threat 
were the leading factors for the Article 5 implementation.  However, NATO as a 
whole was not prepared to take part in the campaign in Afghanistan.  In 
September-October 2001 the United States had to choose between a NATO-led 
or a U.S.-led campaign.  Some Americans appear to have perceived it as a 
choice between (a) the political advantages of NATO-led action and (b) the 
operational advantages of U.S.-led action.  The necessity of fast decisions and 
rapid action, the military capabilities gap between the United States and the 
European allies, and the experience from NATO’s Operation Allied Force in the 
1999 Kosovo crisis defined the United States’ decision, in the words of Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, that “The mission must determine the coalition.”27 
That is, Washington chose to lead a coalition of states having the necessary anti-
                                            
26 Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” 19. 
27 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, remarks at National Defense University, Fort 
McNair, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2002, available at 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html> (10 January 2003). 
6 
terrorist assets with sufficient sustainability and their own airlift and sealift 
capabilities. 
This decision reveals one of the major problems which NATO has yet to 
solve: defining the Alliance’s roles and missions for the twenty-first century.  At 
this stage contradictions exist between declaring the campaign against terrorism 
as one of NATO’s main goals and the limited opportunities for realization of this 
goal.  The asymmetric threat that terrorism poses requires asymmetric 
responses.  Massed military power cannot be fully effective against dispersed 
terrorists who are difficult to distinguish from ordinary citizens.  Additionally, since 
terrorism has both internal and external dimensions, domestic law-enforcement 
and intelligence agencies bear major responsibilities for dealing with terrorist 
threats. 
In practice, the involvement of NATO as a military alliance in the campaign 
against terrorism has included sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
(AWACS) aircraft to the United States, sending naval forces to the Eastern 
Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve, and conducting 
preventive action by NATO’s peacekeeping forces against terrorist groups acting 
within or from the Balkans.28 
The scope of NATO’s reaction to the 11 September attacks, the 
characteristics of international terrorism as an unconventional and asymmetric 
threat, and the relatively small contribution that the military could make in 
combating terrorism constitute factors that support the main hypothesis 
examined in this study: that NATO may be unable to play more than a limited role 
in the fight against international terrorism.  However, the Alliance may yet be able 
to make greater contributions in preventive and protective functions.  It also could 
use its developed mechanisms for crisis and consequence management in 
responses to terrorist attacks.  NATO contributions could be valuable in the 
following areas, among others: counterproliferation operations against 
adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); assistance to 
                                            
28 “Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats.” NATO Handbook, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0106.htm> (24 November 2002). 
7 
states that have suffered WMD terrorist attacks; and further dialogue and 
cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and other Partnership for Peace partners, as 
well as the countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue.  The NATO 
Response Force, approved at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 
and to achieve full operational capability no later than October 2006, could be 
used for collective defense and/or for implementation and enforcement of 
decisions of the United Nations Security Council directed towards neutralizing 
threats posed by terrorism. 
The thesis considers the following questions: 
A. How did NATO react immediately after 11 September 2001? What 
decisions did NATO make in response to these attacks? 
B. What decisions did the United States make about the participation 
of allies in the campaign against Al Qaida and the Taliban leadership in 
Afghanistan? 
C. What actions did NATO undertake in the campaign against 
international terrorism in the period from September 2001 through May 2002? 
D. What could the future role of NATO be in the struggle against 
international terrorism? 
This thesis employs descriptive and analytical approaches to answer 
these questions.  It describes NATO activities in response to the 11 September 
attacks, and then analyzes NATO’s responses and potential future role in the 
campaign against international terrorism.  To trace the events forming NATO’s 
response to the 11 September attacks, the thesis relies on information published 
in official NATO sources.  The analytical part of the thesis draws on official 
statements and various interpretations of NATO’s activities and potential future 
role in combating international terrorism.  
The analysis encompasses the following elements: NATO’s reaction in 
response to the 11 September attacks; the U.S. decisions about the participation 
of allies in the campaign against terrorism; NATO’s support to the U.S.-led 
8 
campaign; the international context of the U.S. and UN operations in 
Afghanistan; and the future role of NATO in the struggle against international 
terrorism. 
The thesis is organized as follows.  The second chapter describes NATO’s 
post-11 September decisions and actions.  The third chapter analyzes NATO’s 
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II. NATO’S RESPONSE TO 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
This chapter chronologically traces the decisions that NATO made in 
response to the 11 September attacks, and the actions that the Alliance 
undertook in support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom.  These 
decisions include the invocation and implementation of Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, sending NATO AWACS aircraft in support of U.S. airspace 
surveillance, deploying naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, and 
collectively and individually implementing other measures requested by the 
United States.  In order to create a better understanding of NATO’s priorities at 
the beginning of September 2001, this chapter initially reviews the most 
significant processes of the last decade of the 20th century that shaped NATO’s 
roles and missions. 
The world changed on 11 September 2001.  This phrase, which has 
already become a cliché, applies to many areas of public life.  Without any doubt, 
this date will leave a profound imprint on the history of the modern world.  It has 
initiated processes that likely mark the beginning of a new epoch in international 
relations and global security.  However, 11 September significantly influenced 
processes that had already started after the end of the Cold War. 
 
A. NATO AT THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER 2001 
One of the most significant dates in the end of the last century is 1 July 
1991.  It marks not only the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact but also the end of 
the East-West bloc-to-bloc opposition.  On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union 
collapsed and gave birth to fifteen independent successor states.  In the 
beginning of the 1990s, most of the former socialist countries made their choice 
for democratization and started the processes of democratic transition and 
consolidation.  A process of dissolution began also in Yugoslavia in 1991, but 
most of the states faced Serbia’s armed resistance, which ignited a series of 
wars within the federation. 
11 
Thérèse Delpech characterizes succinctly the post-Cold War period: 
Granted, new trends distinct from the Cold War were emerging.  A 
limited, regional war in the Persian Gulf had gathered together one 
of the major coalitions in the history of warfare.  Three major actors 
– the United States, Russia, and China – worked with a curious mix 
of cooperation and confrontation.  Intrastate wars were blooming in 
the Balkans, Indonesia, Central Asia, and Africa, but ethnic rivalries 
were hardly the only feature of these conflicts, even in the chaos of 
Africa.  Globalization was an economic, rather than strategic, 
concept and its very meaning remained elusive.  The information 
revolution was changing the nature of the conflict, but exactly how 
was difficult to assess.29 
The changing situation in Europe required adequate reaction from NATO; 
the Alliance had to define “new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of 
collective defense and dialogue with adversaries.”30  According to David Yost, 
“the two most significant new roles are clearly cooperation with former 
adversaries and other non-NATO countries in new institutions such as 
Partnership for Peace, and crisis management and peace operations beyond the 
territory of NATO allies.”31 
NATO established several vehicles for dialogue and cooperation with the 
former members of the Warsaw Pact and with other non-NATO countries: 
Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the 
NATO-Ukraine Commission, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (replaced in 
May 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]), and the 
Mediterranean Dialogue.  
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO-Russia relations have gained 
significant importance with regard to the future of Europe.  “No issue is more 
central to the Alliance’s goal of building a peaceful political order in Europe than 
relations with Russia.”32  Initially Russia expected the disbandment of NATO as a 
                                            
29 Thérèse Delpech, “The Imbalance of Terror,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25 (Winter 
2002), 31-40: 31.  Available at <http://www.twq.com/02winter/delpech.pdf> (9 January 2003). 
30 David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 72. 
31 Ibid., 72. 
32 Ibid., 131. 
12 
reciprocal step in response to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.  NATO’s 
decisions to adapt itself to the changes and to play a key role in European 
security affairs had influenced Russia’s position.  “The issue whether Russia 
could conceivably join the Alliance was an important one in the period from the 
end of 1991 through the middle of 1993.”33  However, by the end of 1993 Russia 
had changed its stance toward opposition to the expansion of NATO.  In 1994-
1995 the Alliance managed to engage Russia in greater cooperation by 
establishing a formalized consultation process in a “16+1” format and inviting 
Russian troops to serve alongside the NATO forces in the peacekeeping 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.34 
The Mediterranean Dialogue, initiated in 1994, aimed “to establish 
contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean 
countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional security.”35  
Within this initiative, NATO has established bilateral cooperation so far with 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
In 1999 NATO accepted three new members: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland.  Until the Prague Summit (22 November 2002), one of the 
Alliance’s main preoccupations was the future of the enlargement process. At 
Prague the allies decided to invite seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) to join the Alliance. 
During the 1990s, NATO faced new challenges requiring military 
responses.  Operation Desert Shield (1990-1991) and Operation Desert Storm 
(1991) were conducted by a U.S.-led coalition.  The role of NATO was limited to 
providing support to Turkey in case of a potential Iraqi attack against this ally. 
The operations finished without such NATO involvement.  In the period 1992-
1995 the Alliance conducted embargo and no-fly-zone enforcement operations 
with reference to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
                                            
33 Stuart Croft et al. The Enlargement of Europe (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), 38. 
34 Ibid., 38-40. 
35 North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, 1 December 1994, par.19. 
13 
In December 1996, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced the 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  IFOR was 
established in December 1995 after NATO intervened in the Bosnia conflict with 
Operation Deliberate Force.  With this move, NATO aimed not only to stabilize 
the Balkans but also to demonstrate its unity and its concern for peace and 
security in Europe.  However, this move was preceded by “the worst crisis in 
NATO since 1956,”36 owing to the reluctance of the U.S. Administration to deploy 
American troops along with those of some European allies, principally Britain and 
France, in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992-1995. 
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, adopted in 1999, has broadened the 
range of the contingences that could pose threats to the security of the member 
countries and has expanded the scope of NATO from regional security to global 
security: 
Alliance security must also take account of the global context. 
Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider 
nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, 
and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled 
movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a 
consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for 
security and stability affecting the Alliance.37 
Operation Allied Force (1999), conducted in response to Serbian atrocities 
in Kosovo, was the largest combat operation in the history of the Alliance to date. 
This operation is also significant because it was conducted without an explicit 
authorization by the U.N. Security Council.  Despite its success, Operation Allied 
Force revealed some cracks in the allies’ unity related to the decision-making 
process and the parameters of the operation.  This operation increased tension 
between NATO and Russia and led Russia to suspend its cooperation with the 
Alliance.  However, the participation of Russian troops in the NATO-led Kosovo 
                                            
36 Ivo Daalder, “Anthony Lake and the War in Bosnia” (Washington, DC: Institute for the 
Study of Diplomacy, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs # 467, 1995), 1. 
37 “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” approved by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23 and 24 April 
1999, par. 24, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> (22 November 
2002). 
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Force (KFOR) reduced this tension.  More extensive NATO-Russia dialogue and 
cooperation resumed in early 2000. 
 
B. THE ARTICLE 5 INVOCATION  
Only a few hours after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NATO 
released a statement condemning the attacks.  In the evening of 11 September 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expressed its solidarity with the United States 
and declared that the United States could rely on its allies for assistance and 
support.  The NAC underlined “the urgency of intensifying the battle against 
terrorism, a battle that NATO countries – indeed all civilized nations – must 
win.”38  The Council also announced the allies’ decision “to stand united in their 
determination to combat this scourge.”39  In a separate statement, the NATO 
Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, declared: “These barbaric acts 
constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and underline the need for 
the international community and the members of the Alliance to unite their forces 
in fighting the scourge of terrorism.”40 
On the next day, 12 September, the NAC conditionally invoked Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty.  The Council declared that, “if it is determined that this 
attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded 
as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an 
armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all.”41  In the same statement the NAC 
reiterated the allies’ readiness to provide the required assistance to the United 
States.  On the same day, the EAPC also condemned the terrorist attacks and 
expressed its solidarity with the United States.  The Council unequivocally 
                                            
38 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 11 September 2001, NATO Press Release 
(2001)122, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm> (21 December 2002). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Statement by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson, 11 September 2001, NATO 
Press Release (2001)121, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-121e.htm> (21 
December 2002). 
41 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 12 September 2001, NATO Press Release 
(2001)124, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm> (21 December 2002). 
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declared the resolve of its members42 to participate actively in the fight against 
terrorism: “We pledge to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of 
terrorism.”43 
In the next two days, the Alliance gained support from two important 
partners: Russia and Ukraine.  Despite the participation of these countries in the 
abovementioned EAPC statement, the NATO-Russia PJC and the NATO-
Ukraine Commission released separate statements. 
The NATO-Russia PJC expressed the determination of both parties to 
intensify their cooperation to defeat terrorism.  NATO member countries and 
Russia declared that they were “united in their resolve not to let those 
responsible for such an inhuman act to go unpunished.”44  They also appealed to 
“the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism.”45 
In its statement the NATO-Ukraine Commission described the 11 
September terrorist attacks as “directed against the very foundation of 
democracy and freedom throughout the world.”46  Ukraine also offered its 
support to allies’ efforts in fighting terrorism.47 
On 20 September 2002, the Deputy Secretary of State of the United 
States, Richard Armitage, visited the NATO Headquarters and briefed the 
                                            
42 The members of the EAPC are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Tadjikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Uzbekistan. The list is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-123e.htm> (Dec 21, 
2002). 
43 Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 12 September 2001, NATO Press 
Release (2001)123, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-123e.htm> (21 December 
2002). 
44 Press Statement from the meeting in extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial level, 13 September 2001, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010913e.htm (21 December 2002). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 14 September 2001, NATO Press Release 
(2001)126, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-126e.htm> (21 December 2002). 
47 Ibid. 
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Secretary General and the NAC on the results from the investigation of the 11 
September attacks up to that date.  Four main points can be derived from the 
released information: (a) “President Bush was putting together a grand coalition 
in preparation for a sustained campaign against terrorism;”48 (b) the target of the 
first retaliatory strike was named: “terrorists and their infrastructure in 
Afghanistan;”49 (c) the campaign would be a “global war on terrorism” which 
would not stop in Afghanistan;50 and (d) the U.S. government’s plans did not 
include a NATO-led military operation.51 
On the basis of a classified briefing given by the United States Department 
of State Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Ambassador Francis Taylor, the NAC 
on 2 October 2001 confirmed the invocation of Article 5.  The briefing included 
the results of the investigation so far, information about Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaida and their role in the 11 September 2001 attacks and in previous terrorist 
acts, and information about the links between Al Qaida and the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.52 
In his statement Lord Robertson was definite about the motives for 
invocation of Article 5: 
The facts are clear and compelling. The information presented 
points conclusively to an Al-Qaida role in the 11 September 
attacks… On the basis of this briefing, it has now been determined 
that the attack against the United States on 11 September was 
directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action 
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty…53 
                                            
48 “High-level US official at NATO HQ.” NATO Update, 20 September 2001, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0917/e0920a.htm> (21 December 2002). 
49 Ibid.  
50 Press Availability: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson, 20 September 2001, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010920a.htm> (21 December 2002). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 2 October 2001, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm> (21 December 2002). 
53 Ibid. 
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However, at that moment it was still unclear “what military action would be 
taken by the Alliance, be it individually or collectively.”54 
 
C. PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES 
The invocation of Article 5 took effect on 4 October 2001, when the NAC 
adopted eight measures requested by the United States, to be taken “individually 
and collectively, to expand the options available in the campaign against 
terrorism.”55  The allies agreed to 
• enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and 
in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by 
terrorism and the actions to be taken against it; 
• provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to 
their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or 
may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their 
support for the campaign against terrorism; 
• take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities 
of the United States and other Allies on their territory; 
• backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that 
are required to directly support operations against terrorism; 
• provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and 
other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic 
arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to 
operations against terrorism; 
• provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and 
airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against 
terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national 
procedures.56 
 
The NAC also declared the Alliance’s readiness “to deploy elements of its 
Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO 
                                            
54 “Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed.” NATO Update, 2 October 2001, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm> (8 February 2003). 
55 Lord George Robertson, Statement to the Press on the North Atlantic Council Decision on 
Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against 
the United States, 4 October 2001, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm> (24 November 2002). 
56 Ibid. 
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presence and demonstrate resolve”57 and “to deploy elements of its NATO 
Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.”58 
 
1. Operation Eagle Assist (9 October 2001 – 16 May 2002) 
In response to the U.S. request and in fulfillment of the NAC decision on 4 
October, on 9 October 2001 the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) 
(see Appendix 1) started deployment of five Airborne Warning and Control 
Systems aircraft (AWACS) to the United States from their main base in 
Geilenkirchen, Germany.  The NATO aircraft were deployed to Tinker Air Force 
Base, Oklahoma, in support of the 552nd Air Control Wing (ACW).  At that time, 
the 552nd ACW was engaged in four theaters of operation.  Its aircraft were 
participating in Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Northern Watch, 
and Southern Watch (the no-flying zones in Iraq). The ACW was also providing 
radar coverage over the United States in support of the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) mission, Operation Noble Eagle.59 
The AWACS provides an air surveillance and early warning 
capability which greatly enhances effective command and control of 
NATO forces by enabling data to be transmitted directly from the 
aircraft to command and control centres on the ground, sea or in 
the air.  There are 24 AWACS in the NATO fleet, based at 
Geilenkirchen, Germany, and RAF Waddington in the United 
Kingdom.60 
Operation Eagle Assist was aimed at enabling the United States to use its 
own AWACS aircraft in the campaign against terrorism, “to enhance NORAD’s 
capability to continue combat air patrol missions and to lower the operational 
tempo of the U.S. AWACS fleet.”61  On 16 January 2002, responding to a 
                                            
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Steve Rolenc, “Tinker, NATO defend America hand in hand,” available at <http://www-
ext.tinker.af.mil/pa/archive/20011019/01-NATO_AWACS.htm> (6 February 2003). 
60 “NATO Airborne Early Warning Aircraft Begin Deploying To The United States,” available 
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1008/e1009b.htm> (6 February 2003). 
61 Rolenc, “Tinker, NATO…” 
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request by the United States, the NAC approved the deployment of two more 
AWACS aircraft in the United States.62 
Operation Eagle Assist ended on 16 May 2002. “The NAC decided to 
conclude the mission following air defense upgrades in the United States and an 
assessment of US homeland security requirements.”63  Within the operation, in 
which 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO nations took part, the NATO AWACS 
aircraft flew nearly 4300 hours in over 360 operational sorties.64 
 
2. Operation Active Endeavour (26 October 2001 – present) 
Following the decision of the NAC, on 6 October 2001 the Standing Naval 
Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) (see Appendix 2) were withdrawn 
from the Exercise Destined Glory 2001 and re-deployed in the Eastern 
Mediterranean to conduct Operation Active Endeavour.  The activation order was 
issued on 26 October, and this date marks the formal beginning of the 
operation.65  “The operation’s mission is to conduct naval operations in the 
Eastern Mediterranean to actively demonstrate NATO’s resolve and solidarity.”66  
Operation Active Endeavour is conducted by the Commander Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH), whose headquarters is located in 
Naples, Italy.  The operation is executed by Task Force Endeavour.67 
The Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) (see Appendix 
3), as well as STANAVFORMED, are part of NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces 
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(IRF) and are trained to deploy rapidly and to conduct a broad range of maritime 
operations.68  Both STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT are made up of 
ships from various allied nations and are subordinated respectively to the 
COMNAVSOUTH and to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).69 
Task Force Endeavour (TFE) initially consisted of eight ships from 
STANAVFORMED.  During the first two months of the operation, about 1700 
merchant vessels were monitored and the shipborne helicopters were flown more 
than 1000 hours.70  On 6 December 2001, STANAVFORLANT, consisting of 
eleven ships, replaced STANAVFORMED and assumed responsibility for the 
operation in the Eastern Mediterranean.  The STANAVFORMED vessels 
returned to national ports for home leave and maintenance.  On 14 January 
2002, STANAVFORMED again replaced STANAVFORLANT. Since then these 
two forces have rotated approximately every three months (see Appendix 4).71 
 
On 6 December 2001, the NAC summarized the implementation of its 
decisions in support of the campaign against terrorism, which were taken after 
the invocation of Article 5: 
[W]e have decided to support, individually and collectively, the 
ongoing US-led military operations against the terrorists who 
perpetrated the 11 September outrages and those who provide 
them sanctuary.  NATO surveillance aircraft are patrolling US 
airspace, for the first time ever. Alliance naval forces have deployed 
to the eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and 
resolve. Our peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, with the support 
of countries of the region, have been acting to prevent terrorist 
groups from operating within and from the Balkans. Individual Allies 
have offered forces and other assets to the campaign against 
terrorism and for use in humanitarian relief.  We will continue our 
                                            
68 Ibid. 
69 Nations contributing to STANAVFORMED are: Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Contributors to STANAVFORLANT 
are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United 
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70 “Operation Active Endeavour…” 
71 Ibid. 
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support to the United States for the US-led operation against these 
terrorists until it has reached its objectives. We will provide this 
support in accordance with our decisions and in full compliance 
with all our commitments under international law and relevant 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.72 
This chapter has described the actions which NATO took collectively in 
response to the U.S. request after the 11 September terrorist attacks. 
Immediately after the attacks NATO demonstrated its determination to act as an 
alliance and to implement its core principle of collective defense.  However, the 
collective support that the United States required was limited to eight specific 
measures, including assistance to the U.S. air defense system and a 
demonstration of NATO’s “resolve and solidarity” in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
Thus the question about NATO’s possible leading role in combating international 
terrorism received its answer.  The abovementioned decisions “clearly 
demonstrate the Allies’ resolve and commitment to support and contribute to the 
U.S.-led fight against terrorism.”73  The United States decided to organize and to 
lead the operation against the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks and the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was providing Al Qaida terrorists a safe 
haven. It became clear that Washington allotted NATO a secondary, supportive 
role in the campaign against terrorism. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF NATO’S RESPONSE 
This chapter first analyzes the decisions of the U.S. government about 
how to organize and conduct retaliatory operations against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the Al Qaida network.  This includes decisions about the 
strategy of the campaign and the motives for inviting specific allies to participate 
in Operation Enduring Freedom.  The United States had recently participated in 
the NATO-led Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict (March-June 1999).  
Despite its success, this operation demonstrated the gap between the military 
capabilities of the United States and those of its allies and the difficulties in 
achieving consensus among the allies on the scope and duration of the operation 
and on the target approval procedures.  Moreover, Operation Allied Force raised 
concerns resulting (a) from internal legislative obstacles that some allies had 
faced during their participation in the operation, and/or (b) from long-standing 
good relations between certain allies and Serbia.  The lessons learned from the 
Kosovo air campaign inevitably influenced the U.S. government in making 
decisions about a U.S.-led anti-terrorist coalition.  The chapter then analyzes 
NATO’s decisions and actions in the period from September 2001 to May 2002 
related to the campaign against terrorism.  Finally, the chapter discusses the 
international participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and analyzes the 
possible implications of this campaign for NATO as a whole, notably with regard 
to the role of military forces in combating terrorism. 
 
A. U.S. DECISIONS IN RESPONSE TO 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
1. Defining the Enemy 
A few hours after the attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed the identity of the 
hijackers: fifteen Saudis, two citizens of the United Arab Emirates, one 
Lebanese, and one Egyptian.  The delayed travel bag of Mohamed Atta, the 
suicide pilot of American Airlines Flight 11 and presumed mastermind of the 
nineteen terrorists, provided a great source of information about the motives and 
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the mindsets of the attackers.  The papers found in the bag contained 
instructions for terrorists on suicide missions and Atta’s last will and testament.74 
Immediately after the attacks, suspicions about a possible link between 
Osama bin Laden and the attacks arose among U.S. officials.  The former 
SACEUR, retired General Wesley Clark, suspected that bin Laden was 
responsible for the terrorist acts.  Al Qaida was considered the only terrorist 
organization capable of organizing and conducting such an operation.75  The 
“largest operation in the history of the FBI” soon gave results.  Coordinated 
investigations in the United States and Germany discovered links between the 
attackers and Al Qaida operatives in Germany.  The results of the investigation 
gave President George W. Bush reason to declare before the Congress on 20 
September 2001: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end 
there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped, and defeated.”76 
The location of bin Laden was relatively clear: since 1996 he had enjoyed 
a safe haven in Afghanistan provided by the Taliban regime.  The U.S. 
administration asked the Afghanistan government to surrender its “guest” to the 
United States.  When it became obvious that the Taliban did not intend to 
cooperate, the United States started preparations for a retaliatory campaign.  The 
short-term aims of the operation were that Osama bin Laden and the other 
perpetrators of the 11 September attacks be apprehended and brought to justice, 
that the Al Qaida installations in Afghanistan be destroyed, and that the Taliban 
regime be toppled.  The long-term objective was proclaimed by President Bush: 
a global war on terrorism (GWOT).77  U.S. policy in this campaign, according to 
                                            
74 Der Spiegel Magazine, Inside 9-11: What Really Happened (New York: St. Martin Press, 
2002), 142-313. 
75 Ibid., 141-167. 
76. President George W. Bush address to Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001, in 
United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (May 2002), i. 
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the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, is based on four 
principles:  
• Making no concessions to terrorists and striking no deals; 
• Bringing terrorists to justice for their crimes; 
• Isolating and applying pressure on states sponsoring terrorism to 
force them to change their behavior; 
• Bolstering the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that 
work with the United States and require assistance.78 
 
2. Definition of the Mission and the Coalition 
The short-term mission required a specific approach in defining the most 
appropriate coalition.  The U.S. administration had to choose between at least 
three options in regard to the forthcoming campaign: 
• The U.S. forces could act alone; 
• The United States could organize a broad coalition; or 
• NATO could take the lead and conduct the campaign. 
 
The first option had probably been excluded in the very first days after 11 
September.  The disclosures about the international character of the terrorist 
network that conducted the attacks and the experiences of other countries from 
their military campaigns in Afghanistan may have influenced the U.S. decision to 
seek broad international support for a U.S.-led campaign. 
Al Qaeda has at its disposal between three thousand and five 
thousand active members in some fifty countries… Terrorist 
subgroups that have become largely subsumed into the network or 
that are collaborating closely with them include the al Gama’a al-
Islamiya in Egypt, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the Yemenite 
group Dscheisch Aden, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, 
and the Pakistani Kashmir Liberation Front.  Connections to the 
Palestinian group Hamas and to Hezbollah, which are financed by 
Iran, are looser.79 
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Afghanistan had historically been a graveyard for foreign invaders.  Both 
the British and the Soviets had had bitter experiences in their campaigns in that 
country.  A new foreign invasion could be used by the Taliban regime and the 
religious leaders to motivate large segments of the population to resist the 
invaders.  Such resistance could significantly complicate the tasks of the U.S.-led 
forces while giving additional time to the key Al Qaida leaders to evacuate. 
These facts, the operational need for bases close to Afghanistan, and the 
risk that some terrorists might flee to neighboring countries defined the need for 
coalition partners not only among Afghanistan’s neighbors but also on a broader 
basis.  The United States recognized that it could gain an important internal ally – 
the Northern Alliance, an armed group resisting the Taliban regime.  The 
Northern Alliance was able to provide forces for the land offensive and could 
frustrate the Taliban’s efforts to unify the population and organize national 
resistance against the foreign forces. 
The U.S. decision to favor a U.S.-led coalition instead of a NATO-led 
coalition is one of the central themes of this thesis.  The U.S. administration 
decided that the mission had to determine the most suitable coalition.  The 
decision about the mission and the coalition was taken within a week after 11 
September.  On 20 September 2001, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of 
State, informed the NAC of President Bush’s efforts to arrange a grand coalition.  
This meant that the United States had decided to take the lead in organizing the 
impending campaign. 
At least three considerations may have played a role in the U.S. decision 
to organize a U.S.-led broad antiterrorist campaign instead of a NATO-led 
operation: (a) the need to involve in the coalition a broad range of partners from 
all over the world – both states and sub-state actors (such as the Northern 
Alliance); (b) the preference to avoid constraints on U.S. latitude that might arise 
in a NATO-led operation and to guarantee the speed and freedom of an 
independent action through a U.S.-led campaign, i.e., to implement the lessons 
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learned from the NATO-led Operation Allied Force in Kosovo; and (c) the 
capabilities gap between the United States and the other NATO allies. 
 
a. Coalition Partners 
International terrorism cannot be defeated by the unilateral efforts 
of a single country.  In the words of the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell,  
In this global campaign against terrorism, no country has the luxury 
of remaining on the sidelines.  There are no sidelines.  Terrorists 
respect no limits, geographic or moral.  The frontlines are 
everywhere and the stakes are high.  Terrorism not only kills 
people.  It also threatens democratic institutions, undermines 
economies, and destabilizes regions.80 
An efficient fight against international terrorist organizations 
requires common and coordinated contributions in a wide range of areas: 
legislative, judicial, law-enforcement, military, financial, religious, etc.  This option 
could provide the United States an opportunity to select which of the offered 
assets to accept and to request support in specific areas of the campaign against 
terrorism.  Another important aspect in regard to the coalition participants was 
the United States gaining support and partners among the Muslim states.  This 
would prevent possible misinterpretations and speculations that might present 
the campaign against terrorism as a conflict between Christianity and Islam or as 
a war of Western civilization against Islamic civilization. 
 
b. NATO’s Cohesion versus Independent Action: 
Implications from Operation Allied Force 
The strikes against Al Qaida and the Taliban military installations 
had to be fast, surprising, and effective in order to prevent Taliban forces from re-
grouping and to prevent terrorists from escaping.  Some of the targets (e.g., the 
top Al Qaida leaders) were dynamic and their capture was expected to be heavily 
dependent on intelligence support.  Swift changes in the required strategy and 
ed.  All these factors would demand rapid decisions.  tactics could also be expect                                            
80 Colin L. Powell, Preface by Secretary of State in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, iii; 
emphasis in the original. 
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On the one hand, a NATO-led operation might increase the cohesion of the 
Alliance and provide NATO with new roles and missions for the 21st century.  
Additionally, NATO could increase its importance as a factor for international 
security, especially after conducting a successful operation far beyond its 
traditional area of responsibility.  On the other hand, the United States had the 
experience and the lessons learned from its participation in Operation Allied 
Force in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. 
The forthcoming campaign in Afghanistan “was not the kind of war 
that required large numbers of military personnel, and the command and control 
problems of a multilingual force away from familiar NATO terrain would have 
been challenging.”81 
Only the British had the sealift and in-flight refueling capabilities to 
get troops to the region under their own steam and to keep them 
supplied once in place… Allies might also have proved restrictive 
on American freedom of action, as NATO allies had an occasion 
been over target selection during the Kosovo bombing campaign.82 
During the preparation and execution of Operation Allied Force, the 
United States faced several difficulties with the European allies.  Some of these 
allies had internal policies or military capability constraints affecting their 
participation in the operation. 
Several Alliance members lacked domestic support for an offensive 
operation in Kosovo.  In Greece, domestic opposition ran as high 
as 90 percent, and the Italian government feared that internal 
divisions over the operation could shatter its ruling coalition.83 
The target approval process was another area in which different 
national policies and bureaucratic procedures affected the speed and the 
effectiveness of the operation and even the safety of the allies’ aircraft. 
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When Operation Allied Force commenced, NATO’s Master Target 
File included 169 targets, of which 51 were initially approved.  By 
the end of the operation in June 1999, it had grown to include more 
than 976 targets, enough to fill six volumes.  Because NATO had 
not anticipated a long campaign, the newly nominated targets had 
not been developed fully in advance.  Each of the additional 807 
targets had to be proposed, reviewed, and approved by NATO and 
national authorities before being added to the master list.  This 
cumbersome process revealed major divisions among the NATO 
allies and limited the military effectiveness of the operation.84 
In addition, “parallel U.S. and NATO command and control 
structures and systems complicated operational planning and maintenance of 
unity of command.”85 
The United States also had concerns about sharing secret 
information with its NATO allies: 
Even when the United States decided to share information with its 
allies, the process of clearing and distributing that information did 
not flow smoothly.  Delays and restrictions consistently hindered 
this process, which made it hard for the NATO allies to have a full 
operational picture.86 
Moreover, “the United States deliberately excluded France from 
accessing NATO’s top secret plans, in order to reduce the likelihood of leaks to 
Belgrade.”87 
 
c. The Military Capabilities Gap: Implications from 
Operation Allied Force 
The gap between the military capabilities of the United States and 
those of its European allies, which became obvious during Operation Allied 
Force, provoked concerns and debates in the Alliance.  In his remarks at the 
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Defence Week Conference, held in Brussels in 2000, Lord George Robertson 
stated: 
The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the 
European Allies had become on U.S. military capabilities.  From 
precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops 
that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate 
logistical support, the European Allies did not have enough of the 
right stuff. 
On paper, Europe has 2 million men and women under arms – 
more than the United States.  But despite those 2 million soldiers, it 
was a struggle to come up with 40,000 troops to deploy as 
peacekeepers in the Balkans.  Something is wrong and Europe 
knows it.88 
Operation Allied Force demonstrated the imbalance between the 
U.S. and the European capabilities.  The share of the U.S. contribution to the 
operation is impressive: 
• 60% of all sorties 
• 80% of all weapons delivered 
• 95% of cruise missiles launched 
• 650 of 927 participating aircraft 
• 70% of all supporting missions 
• 320 B-52, B-1, and B-2 sorties dropped half of the total of 
bombs delivered 
• 90% of all EW [electronic warfare] assets 
• all stealth assets 
• all Airborne Command and Control facilities 
• most of the equipment and manpower for the Combined Air 
Operations Center in Vicenza 
• most of the Air-to-Air Refueling capability89 
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• 90% of the employed and vital mobile target acquisition 
capability 
• most of the Combat Search and Rescue capabilities.90 
 
According to David Yost, “European contributions in Operation 
Allied Force were particularly strong in combat air patrol; air-to-ground strike 
operations in good weather; and in surveillance, reconnaissance, and battle-
damage assessment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and manned aircraft 
such as Tornados, Étendard IVPs, and Mirage IVPs.”91  However, “an average of 
three American support aircraft was required for each European strike sortie.”92 
These facts suggest that in a possible Alliance military operation far 
beyond Europe the burden for providing support to the allies would be much 
greater for the United States and could degrade the speed and the effectiveness 
of the operation. 
The RAND Corporation has presented some of the lessons learned 
from Operation Allied Force: 
• Although Alliance and U.S. media news releases during the 
operation recognized the contributions of all participating air 
forces, the United States was responsible for a 
disproportionately large share of the effort.  The Europeans 
certainly made some important contributions to combat 
operations… However, the allies generally lacked the level 
of precision and all-weather capabilities that would allow 
them to carry out their missions by day and night while 
ensuring minimum civilian damage.93 
• Intra-Alliance politics made Operation Allied Force possible 
but also resulted in political and operational constraints that 
imposed limitations on warfare.  The conditions of coalition 
warfare produced a relatively slow, deliberate air campaign, 
in contrast to the U.S. preference for high-tempo, continuous 
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operations and overwhelming levels of force. The slower 
style of campaign was necessary to accommodate the 
consultative and deliberative functions of the coalition and to 
secure domestic and international popular support for the 
operation.  Public support depended in large part on 
assurances that the risk of civilian casualties and damage 
was low.  To minimize this risk, the Alliance limited the size, 
pace, targets, and amount of force used in the campaign.94 
• Despite years of multinational, cooperative planning within 
the Alliance, the allies found it difficult to agree on a common 
approach.  The consensus for action was fragile in the 
absence of an immediate threat to allied territory or 
traditional interests.  Disputes within the Alliance centered on 
three issues: whether a "gradualist" approach to the air war 
would succeed, whether the United States had the right to 
keep some sensitive information in U.S.-only channels, and 
whether ground forces should be introduced.95 
• Operation Allied Force highlighted some key differences in 
the perspectives of the United States and the European 
countries.  The U.S. decision to maintain some information in 
U.S.-only channels occurred out of concern over the 
increased potential for information leaks in coalition 
operations.  But many European countries resented the 
United States for what they considered to be overbearing 
control that excluded them from many decisions and 
minimized their involvement in others.  In addition, many of 
the European allies were deeply uncomfortable with the legal 
basis of Operation Allied Force, which was carried out 
without the authorization of the United Nations or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).96 
 
Analyzing the implications of the Kosovo crisis, David Yost predicted that 
“[t]he tension between inclusiveness and effectiveness, a challenge to some 
degree for all international organizations, could become even more acute with 
regard to optional actions in support of collective security, in contrast with cases 





clearly demanding collective defense – that is, acts of aggression directly 
threatening the security of one or more members of NATO.”97   
According to a report by the Defense Committee of the British House of 
Commons, 
Some of our witnesses believe that the US experience in the 
Kosovo campaign and the need to conduct operations through 
consensus, resulting in what has been described as ‘war by 
committee’, had convinced the US military that the experience 
should not be repeated and that means other than NATO should be 
used in conducting future campaigns.98 
 
3. Coalition Dynamics and Operation Enduring Freedom 
The U.S. imperative in regard to the campaign in Afghanistan had been, in 
the words of the Defense Committee of the British House of Commons, “to strike 
quickly and with force against terrorists in Afghanistan and… the reality of the 
situation was that it would have been difficult to get all 19 NATO countries to act 
within the four week period which the US was able to achieve.”99  Tomas 
Valasek argues that 
Excluding NATO from America’s fledging war on terrorism does 
hold some advantages from the U.S. perspective.  No longer does 
Washington need to seek the approval of all 19 allies for each and 
every step of the military campaign, as was the case in Kosovo.  
U.S. commanders need not worry whom to trust with key 
intelligence or who might leak it to the enemy.100 
The military phase of the campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring 
Freedom, began on 7 October 2001 with cruise missile and air strikes on Taliban 
military installations and Al Qaida training camps.  Britain was the only NATO ally 
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that took part in the missile attacks and the air strikes at the beginning of the 
campaign.  Another U.S. ally on the ground was the Northern Alliance.  With U.S. 
air support and the assistance of small numbers of U.S. special forces, by 9 
November 2001 the Northern Alliance captured the key city of Mazar-e-Sharif in 
Northern Afghanistan. On 14 November, the Northern Alliance entered the 
capital, Kabul.  “Only after more than a month of fighting did the White House 
accept the allies’ offers of thousands of combat and support troops, and then 
only in limited numbers and outside NATO’s chain of command.”101 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the current counterterrorist 
operations is that the world’s strongest military alliance, NATO, is 
nowhere in sight.  The formerly 16, now 19, allies spent decades 
planning for jointly defending one another from an attack.  Yet when 
the military operations began, the White House essentially asked 
NATO to stay out of the conflict, despite its offers of help and the 
gallant gesture of evoking the mutual defense clause in its founding 
document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, for the first time ever.102 
 
B. DECISIONS BY NATO AS A WHOLE 
1. The Article 5 Invocation 
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, in the evening of 11 September 
2001, the NAC declared that “the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North 
America and Europe for assistance and support.”103  At that critical moment 
neither the U.S. government nor the NAC had reliable information about the 
origin of the attacks.  The motives and the perpetrators were unclear; there was 
no claimed responsibility; and nobody set demands or conditions.  The obvious 
facts were that three of the hijacked planes had completely demolished the Twin 
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the west wing of the 
Pentagon in Washington, and had thereby caused thousands of deaths.  The 
terrorist attacks were surprising and shocking; their enormity and barbarism were 
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sobering for all; and the success of the attacks against the strongest NATO 
member revealed the vulnerability of each state and its institutions. 
However, some of the European allies have had a greater experience than 
the United States has had in tackling domestic terrorism, and they knew that no 
one is assured against terrorist attacks.  The perception of vulnerability, the 
solidarity with the United States, and the anger and indignation at the brutal 
terrorist acts unified NATO allies and their partners in their resolve to support the 
United States in the response to the challenge of terrorism.  The lack of 
information about the terrorists and their motives and identity led to the 
conditional invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  The allies had to 
wait for the results from the investigation, which was to reveal whether the 
attacks were directed from abroad.  This was set as a condition for the effective 
invocation of Article 5. 
Article 5 defines the conditions upon which the principle of collective 
defense could be applied: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use 
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 
shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.104 
The applicability of Article 5 to terrorist attacks against the United States 
requires additional analysis.  Article 5, referring to Article 51 of the Charter of the 
e right of individual or collective self-defense in case United Nations, foresees th                                            
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of an armed attack against one or more allies.  The condition for effective 
application of Article 5 in response to the 11 September attacks was a 
confirmation to be presented to the NAC that the attacks were directed from 
outside the United States. 
The case was complicated because the attacks were conducted within the 
United States with U.S. civilian aircraft.  The hijackers used box-cutters to 
intimidate and neutralize the crews, and then directed the aircraft toward their 
designated targets.  Could this be considered an armed attack against the United 
States?  
If the civilian aircraft were used as powerful guided missiles against U.S. 
targets with the intention of causing a maximum of casualties, the answer is that 
this would be an armed attack against the United States.  However, the aircraft 
were American; they did not come from abroad; they took off from U.S. 
airports.105 
The first official indication about the identity of the perpetrators of the 11 
September attacks was presented to the NATO Secretary General and to the 
NAC by the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, Richard Armitage, on 
20 September 2001.  This was the information necessary to effectively invoke 
Article 5.  Despite Lord Robertson’s reiteration of the Alliance’s determination to 
contribute to the campaign in response to the terrorist attacks, the message of 
the Deputy Secretary of State was clear: “I didn’t … come here to ask for 
anything.  I came here to share with good Allies the information we have.”106  
U.S. statements and actions made it clear that the campaign would be conducted 
by a U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” – which also might be called a “coalition of 
the chosen” – and that NATO would not be expected to play a leading role in the 
forthcoming operation. 
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Washington made it clear that the counterterrorist campaign will be 
led by the United States, not NATO.  “If we need collective action, 
we’ll ask for it,” said U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul 
Wolfowitz.  Campaign decisions are made in the Pentagon, not in 
Brussels.107 
However, the Alliance would have been put in a delicate situation if the 
invocation of Article 5 were not applied in practice.  Most of the measures 
requested by the United States and adopted by the NAC on 4 October 2001 
relate to the provision of support from individual allies.  In other words, the United 
States could achieve a considerable part of the requested support on a bilateral 
basis: intelligence sharing, blanket overflight clearances, access to airfields and 
seaports, increased security for the U.S. facilities abroad, etc. 
 
2. Collective Measures in Support of the Campaign Against 
Terrorism 
The most significant collective measures, among the eight adopted by the 
NAC, are the deployment of seven NATO AWACS aircraft to the United States 
(Operation Eagle Assist) and the deployment of NATO Standing Naval Forces to 
the Eastern Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour).  While the former 
operation had some practical applicability to the campaign against terrorism 
(relieving U.S. AWACS aircraft for participation in Operation Enduring Freedom), 
the latter operation has had a more symbolic character so far – “providing 
presence and demonstrating resolve,” according to official statements, as noted 
in Chapter II. 
The eastern rim of the Mediterranean Sea is shaped by the coastlines of 
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya.  While two of 
these states are NATO members and two are participants in NATO’s 
Mediterranean Dialogue, two other countries, Libya and Syria, are presented in 
the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 as supporters of 
terrorism.108  However, both Libya and Syria condemned the 11 September 
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attacks and, in different ways, have recently tried to divest themselves of ties to 
terrorism.109  Citizens of Egypt and Lebanon participated in the 11 September 
suicide terrorist attacks. 
Sending naval vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean could be considered 
as a warning and expression of resolve against states sponsoring terrorism.  
However, the types of ships comprising Task Force Endeavour (TFE) are far 
removed from those designated to destroy land-based targets.  The first 
STANAVFORMED group participating in Operation Active Endeavour consisted 
of seven frigates and one destroyer.  The primary purpose of such ships is 
conducting maritime interception activities; and they are armed with ship-to-ship, 
ship-to-air, and anti-submarine weapons.  For instance, the armaments of the 
frigate HMS Chatham, then flagship of STANAVFORMED, consists of 
• one 114mm (4.5-inch) MK8 gun; 
• one Goalkeeper close-in weapons system (CIWS); 
• one Sea Wolf anti-missile system; 
• two quad Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers; 
• two 20mm close-range guns; 
• two triple anti-submarine torpedo tubes; 
• NATO Seagnat and DLF3 Decoy launchers; and 
• two magazine launched anti-submarine torpedo tubes.110 
 
The Greek guided missile destroyer HS Formion (the former USS Joseph 
Strauss) is armed with 
• two 127mm (5-inch) MK42 guns; 
• two triple MK32 torpedo launchers; 
• one MK16 ASROC anti-submarine missile launcher; and 
• one MK13 Mod.0 missile launcher for Standard and Harpoon anti-
ship missiles.111 
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 It remains unclear what kinds of operations these ships would be able to 
perform against diverse international terrorist organizations.  One of the TFE’s 
tasks may be to present a deterrence posture so as to prevent possible terrorist 
attacks similar to that against the USS Cole in 2000.  In practice, TFE has been 
engaged in monitoring the merchant vessels in the region.  In conducting this 
task, TFE could possibly intercept ships illegally trafficking in weapons or 
immigrants.  However, since the beginning of Operation Active Endeavour, no 
such results have been publicly reported. 
STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT have been the only elements 
of NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) used in support of the U.S.-led 
campaign against terrorism.  The structure of the IRF shows that NATO could 
hardly offer in the short term greater and more effective support relevant to the 
anti-terrorist campaign.  In peacetime, the military forces that allies commit to 
Allied Command Europe (ACE) remain under national command.  Under 
SACEUR’s peacetime command are the ACE Mobile Force (Land), or the 
AMF(L), the NAEWF, STANAVFORMED, and most air defense and some 
communications units. The Reaction Forces (Air), or RF(A), have no permanent 
peacetime headquarters and elements subordinated to SACEUR.  Nationally 
assigned units would be transferred under SACEUR’s command when 
necessary.112 
While the fundamental basis for the AMF remains, its roles and 
missions have been adapted to changes in the security 
environment.  The AMF(L) mission is being adjusted to include 
peace support related operations...  The AMF(L) today is one of the 
first military options within the crisis management system available 
to NATO and can be deployed by SACEUR on very short notice 
upon request of a nation and upon approval of NATO’s Defence 
Planning Committee…  When the full component of the AMF(L) is 
brought together, it becomes a balanced force made up of infantry 
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battalions, artillery batteries and support units, with a fighting 
strength of a brigade group of about 5000 personnel. The AMF(L) 
primary role remains to demonstrate solidarity and resolve in 
support of peacetime deterrence… 
The above paragraph makes it clear that SACEUR does not have in 
peacetime command over land forces deployable and sustainable far beyond the 
Alliance’s area of responsibility, and able to conduct asymmetric warfare.  In the 
words of two British experts, 
Yet despite the invocation of Article 5, there are particular 
difficulties in using mechanisms of the alliance as a vehicle for 
military response.  Political and intelligence assessments of extra-
European developments have not been a priority within NATO.  
Expertise on the Islamic world and Middle Eastern and Central 
Asian states varies widely among the member states and 
interpretations of regional trends also differ…  Few European allies 
– except for Britain and France – have the capability to project and 
support forces as far as the Persian Gulf, let alone further.  The 
political symbolism of alliance solidarity in the wake of non-
conventional attacks by non-state actors is not therefore 
translatable into common military action, beyond the area defined 
by the North Atlantic Treaty.113 
However, on 6 December 2001, NATO stated that its “peacekeeping 
forces in the Balkans, with the support of countries of the region, have been 
acting to prevent terrorist groups from operating within and from the Balkans.”114 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
1. Implications of the Operations in Afghanistan 
In order to be effective, the fight against international terrorism demands 
international cooperation.  Counterterrorism based on unilateralism can hardly 
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achieve significant results against diverse international terrorist networks.  As Ian 
Lesser puts in,  
The risks cross borders and may have global reach.  As a result, it 
is difficult to imagine effective counterterrorism policies pursued on 
a national or unilateral basis.  Again, the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon make this clear.  The attacks left 
victims from over 80 countries.  Suspects in the attacks have been 
arrested in some 80 states.  Most of the planning for the 11 
September attacks, and for Al Qaeda operations outside of the 
Middle East in general, appears to have taken place in Europe.  So 
even from the point of view of American counterterrorism policy, 
understandably focused on “homeland defense,” international 
cooperation is essential.115 
The United States started building a large coalition immediately after 11 
September.  The initial aim of the coalition was to assist the United States in 
conducting the operation against the organizers of the terrorist attacks and their 
supporters, and to coordinate efforts to trace the international links and to 
apprehend suspected members of Al Qaida, rather than to employ coalition 
forces in the military campaign.  As mentioned before, the first cruise missile 
attacks and air strikes were conducted mainly by the United States, supported 
only by the United Kingdom.  One of the reasons for the British involvement in 
the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom was that the United Kingdom was 
the European ally best equipped with functioning force projection capabilities at 
that time, including airlift, sealift, in-flight refueling, and precision-guided missiles.  
Another reason for British involvement probably resided in the long-standing 
close relations between London and Washington. 
According to Martin Walker, 
Britain instantly offered its unconditional support “until the end,” 
took part in the first cruise missile and air strikes on Afghanistan on 
7 October, and offered to commit its renowned SAS Special 
Forces, along with 4,200 other specialist troops and Royal Marines.  
This triggered a Dutch offer of their own marines, who now train 
alongside their British comrades.  France offered reconnaissance 
aircraft and special forces.  Italy and Spain offered their mountain 
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troops, the Czechs offered their highly regarded chemical warfare 
detection and treatment units, and Germany offered whatever 
military assistance the United States might need.116 
The Afghan Interim Authority took office on 22 December 2001.  In order 
to provide support to the new government and to create conditions for the post-
Taliban recovery of the country, on 20 December 2001 the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1386 to establish the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). 
International contributions to the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan 
and to the UN-led ISAF have achieved significant dimensions.  According to the 
U.S. Department of State, as of 14 June 2002, 69 nations had supported the 
campaign against terrorism, and 20 nations had deployed more than 16,000 
troops to the U.S. Central Command’s region of responsibility.  The total number 
of non-Afghan forces in the country is about 15,000, of which 8,000 belong to 
U.S. coalition partners.117 
In fulfillment of the eight measures for expanding the options in the 
campaign against terrorism, adopted by the NAC on 4 October 2001, the NATO 
allies provided, both individually and collectively, the following contributions: 
• All 19 NATO Allies and the 9 NATO “aspirants” [without the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia] have provided 
blanket overflight rights, ports/bases access, refueling assistance, 
and increased law-enforcement cooperation… 
• 16 Allies now support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan and the global campaign against terrorism… 14 Allies 
have deployed forces in the region.  9 Allies are participating in 
combat operations. 
• Allies and other partner countries have deployed nearly 4,000 
troops to Afghanistan and also provide 95% of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led first by the United Kingdom 
and now by Turkey.118 
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Despite the fact that NATO has not played a leading role in the U.S.-led 
campaign against terrorism since 11 September 2001, one of its most important 
contributions has been common standards, procedures, planning, and training.  It 
has also promoted force interoperability, so that the allies’ forces can fight 
successfully alongside each other, even outside NATO’s chain of command.  In 
the words of Ian Lesser, “the Alliance played and continues to play a critical 
consensus-building role.  The multinational operations in Afghanistan have 
clearly been facilitated by the planning capabilities and habits of cooperation 
developed by the Alliance.”119 
Regarding NATO’s contributions to the campaign against terrorism, Lord 
Robertson stated on 14 June 2002: 
NATO has… proved its value as a platform for coalition operations.  
The Allies are making contributions to the two continuing operations 
in Afghanistan… They are able to do so effectively only because of 
years of developing common procedures within the Alliance.120 
 
2. Post-11 September NATO-Russia Relations 
Although on 11 September 2001 a new page in NATO-Russia relations 
was opened, the process of rapprochement started after the appointment of 
Vladimir Putin as Acting President of Russia on 31 December 1999.  In March 
2000, a meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was held with an 
agenda broader than peacekeeping in the Balkans.  Since then, despite Western 
unease with Russia’s operations in Chechnya, cooperation has become more 
intense.121  According to Martin Walker, 
After September 11, despite the opposition of much of Russia’s 
security establishment, including his old KGB colleague, Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov, Putin agreed to an unprecedented and far-
reaching support of Bush’s war on terrorism.  He ordered Russian 
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Intelligence (FSB) to share information on the Taliban and opened 
Russian airspace to American logistics aircraft.  He overruled the 
earlier statements of his military establishment to accept a U.S. 
military presence in Uzbekistan, and helped rearm and equip the 
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.122 
Russian diplomacy seized the opportunity and undertook moves to put 
Russia and the Chechnya problem in the context of the campaign against 
terrorism.  “[T]he al-Qaida network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had 
long been accused by Russia of aiding and radicalising rebel groups in 
Chechnya and fomenting instability along Russia’s southern rim.  The notion of 
‘common interests’ had never been clearer, on either side.”123 
Russia joined the anti-terrorist coalition and the allies welcomed this step.  
However, they have chosen to revise their stance toward the Chechen conflict.  
Apparently for the allies it might be more important to have Russia as a partner 
than to insist on supporting the various Chechen “freedom fighters.”  At the 
NATO-Russia Conference on the Military Role in Combating Terrorism, Lord 
Robertson stated, “The terrorist threat is not new.  Our Russian colleagues, who 
have seen the tragic loss of countless military and civilian lives at the hands of 
terrorists over the past decade, can bear witness to that.”124 
At the same event, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, set forth 
Russia’s conditions for further cooperation in the struggle against terrorism: “If 
somebody still finds it beneficial to render ‘hearty welcome’ to representatives of 
the Chechen terrorist groups… then we state it firmly that all talking about our 
unity and solidarity may remain ‘empty words.’”125 
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Recently, the U.S. administration declared a shift in the U.S. position 
regarding Chechnya and terrorism.  On 28 February 2003, the U.S. Secretary of 
State designated three Chechen organizations as terrorist groups in view of their 
direct involvement in the hostage-taking at Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater in 
October 2002.  However, the U.S. government stated clearly that it does not 
consider all Chechen fighters terrorists.126 
Since October 2001, NATO and Russia have launched several initiatives 
related to the common struggle against terrorism.  Some of these initiatives 
include “regular exchange of information and in-depth consultation on issues 
relating to terrorist threats, the prevention of the use by terrorists of ballistic 
missile technology and nuclear, biological and chemical agents, civil emergency 
planning, and the exploration of the role of the military in combating terrorism.”127 
On 28 May 2002, the NATO-Russia PJC was replaced by the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC), which enables Russia to participate in discussions as an 
equal partner, as one among twenty (“at 20” instead of “19+1”).  Nevertheless, 
Russia will not have a right to veto NATO’s decisions.  The NRC will focus its 
efforts on the following areas: terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, 
arms control, theatre missile defense, civil emergencies, military cooperation and 
defense reform, new threats and challenges, and search and rescue at sea.128 
In June 2002, Lord Robertson outlined the importance of the NATO-
Russia partnership as follows: 
Countering terrorism is at the heart of NATO’s new relationship with 
Russia… We need Russia to face new and common threats, just as 
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much as Russia needs us.  Russia is now willing to play an honest, 
cooperative role in working with us.129 
 
This chapter has analyzed the role that NATO has played in the post-11 
September campaign against terrorism.  After 11 September, the United States 
decided to lead a “coalition of the willing” rather than to transfer the initiative to 
the Alliance.  Several factors influenced that decision, including the need for 
speed and effectiveness in the campaign in Afghanistan, the lessons learned 
from the NATO-led Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict, and the military 
capabilities gap between the United States and its allies. 
The military role that NATO has had in the campaign against terrorism has 
been mainly supportive, but the experience that the allies have gained as a result 
of their common work for decades within the Alliance provides them with a solid 
basis for effectively participating in military operations outside NATO’s chain of 
command.  As Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution has noted, 
While NATO’s formal military role was necessarily very limited in 
the first weeks of the military campaign, the alliance’s political 
solidarity was highly significant, as is the military interoperability 
that will allow some allies to participate in later stages of the 
campaign.130 
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 also 
gave a new impetus to NATO-Russia relations.  The cooperation in countering 
terrorism has proven to be of importance to both parties. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis of NATO’s participation 
in responding to the 11 September attacks. This includes implications about the 
future role of the Alliance in combating international terrorism, based on the 
characteristics of the asymmetric conflicts, on the possible role of the military in 
combating terrorism and on NATO’s current role in the campaign against 
terrorism.  It appears that currently NATO can play only a limited and mainly 
supportive role in fighting terrorism, while the larger responsibilities continue to 
remain on the shoulders of national governments.  The new threats to 
international security require the Alliance to adapt to meet the challenges of the 
21st century.  As during previous periods of transition, the Alliance will need to 
redefine its roles and missions and to develop appropriate capabilities to deal 
with the new threats. 
 
A. TERRORISM AS AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT 
In the words of Thérèse Delpech, after the 11 September terrorist attacks,  
something different, something unrecognizable, something 
irreconcilable with concepts inherited from past experiences of 
either war or terrorism has come into being. This new phenomenon, 
however, does have a name: asymmetric warfare…  Such an 
extraordinary attack, in real time and real space, gave asymmetry a 
horrific shape.131 
Symmetric warfare is characterized by similar military capabilities in the 
hands of opponents of comparable strength.  The outcome of such warfare 
depends on superiority in tactics, sustainability, training, armaments, logistics, 
national resources, etc.  Asymmetric warfare is characterized by significant 
differences in the military capabilities and tactics of the belligerents, and the 
outcome may be determined by an ability to exploit the opponent’s weaknesses. 
[T]he United States found itself contemplating exactly the opposite 
wanted to fight, against an enemy able to find of the sort of war it                                             
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sanctuary by merging into a mountainous and inaccessible terrain 
for defensive purposes and possessing the ability to merge with 
global civil society to mount attacks against enemy assets, 
including in its homeland.  The extremity of its weakness in 
conventional military terms is matched by the extremity of its 
dependence on terrorism.132 
Delpech analyzes the 11 September attacks by highlighting major 
differences between a superpower state and a terrorist organization.  She 
describes the terrorist tactics that were successful on 11 September as follows: 
• Have no center and strike at the heart of the superpower. 
• The United States wants life at any cost?  Kill as many civilians as 
possible. 
• Reveal U.S. vulnerability to rustic means of war. 
• Fight the kind of war the United States hates: an elusive enemy 
who uses guerrilla tactics. 
• The United States makes military plans years ahead, so surprise 
them continuously. 
• Because the United States worries about collateral damage, fight 
unrestricted and total war. 
• The United States places a premium on transparency, so act like a 
secret sect.133 
 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft argues that in asymmetric conflict, in which the stronger 
opponent is attacking and the weaker one is defending, the strong opponent will 
only have a chance for success if it applies a combat strategy analogous to that 
of the weak actor (e.g. direct attack versus direct defense, or indirect attack 
versus indirect defense).  Otherwise, different strategies would help the weak 
opponent defeat the attacker.134   
For this reason, counterterrorism forces should be prepared to conduct 
both conventional and unconventional warfare.  While the law-enforcement 
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agencies bear the primary responsibilities for dealing with internal terrorist threats 
and the external intelligence agencies might be used to support covert operations 
abroad to neutralize terrorist leaders, the role of the military in combating 
terrorism remains limited. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN COMBATING TERRORISM 
The applicability of military force in anti-terrorist operations has two 
dimensions: internal and external.  The use of military forces for internal security 
purposes is a central issue for democratic civil-military relations.   
The diapason of concepts for military involvement varies from a fully 
militarized response to military support to the civil authorities (MSCA).  In the first 
case, “the armed forces can contribute the firepower, force projection capability 
and expertise, such as hostage rescue commandos, sophisticated bomb disposal 
teams and specialist marksmen which the civilian police is unable to provide.”135  
Under MSCA, “the military’s role is strictly limited to support the police and civil 
authorities, and the army… can be held accountable for its actions under the 
criminal and civil laws.”136  Moreover, according to Paul Wilkinson, 
A fully militarized response implies the complete suspension of the 
civilian legal system and its replacement by martial law, summary 
punishments, the imposition of curfews, military censorship and 
extensive infringements of normal civil liberties in the name of 
exigencies of war. By adopting a totally militarized response the 
government inevitably finds it has removed all the constraints of 
legal accountability and minimum force, enabling the military 
commanders to deploy massively lethal and destructive firepower in 
the name of suppressing terrorism.137 
Some states (Germany, for example) have adopted more restrictive laws 
limiting to a maximum extent the options for such internal military deployments, 
while others (such as Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) foresee broader options for using the specific 
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skills of the military in crisis responses, including counterterrorism.138  In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, in the case of an internal threat to national 
sovereignty, “it would be legitimate to deploy force in support of the civil authority, 
as for example in counterterrorism.”139  According to Boëne and Martin, who 
analyzed the role of the French military,  
It was recognized… that the more serious threats in the new 
environment might be not military in the pre-1990 definition of the 
term.  Destabilization of the country from within is now a clear and 
present danger.  Although many have come to doubt the armed 
forces’ relevance to risks such as terrorism, uncontrolled 
immigration, drug trafficking, internal violence spilling from 
immigrant “no-go areas,” or the internationalization of organized 
crime, the [French government’s] DWP [Defense White Paper] 
emphasized the need for closer links between internal and external 
security; such connections would imply new, still unspecified roles 
for the military.140 
However, Paul Wilkinson expresses some reasonable concerns about the 
internal, law-enforcement roles of the military in democratic states: 
Even in well-established democratic political systems, there are 
some major risks involved in deploying the military abroad or on 
their own territory for the purposes of combating international 
organized crime.  The military are trained to fight external foes and 
to use maximum force.  The police, on the other hand, are trained 
to use minimum force, and, if possible, to bring suspects to trial, 
following criminal investigation.  The military have generally been 
trained and equipped, at considerable expense, to carry out the 
important and difficult duties of external defence… Last, but not 
least, there is a great danger that, once having committed the 
military, the government will be unable or unwilling to withdraw 
them, thus making the community and the police increasingly 
dependent on the military presence.141 
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Consolidated democracies offer different examples of defining the role of 
the military, but it is a common wisdom that “governments should only employ 
troops for internal security purposes with the very greatest reluctance, and… if 
they are compelled to deploy them they should seek to withdraw them at the 
earliest opportunity.”142  Wilkinson presents a few reasons to support the 
principle of limiting use of the military for internal security purposes: 
• [I]t may be assumed that the belligerent faction or factions enjoy at 
least some support or sympathy in sections of the general 
population.  Hence, an unnecessary high military profile may 
merely serve to escalate the level of violence by polarizing pro- and 
anti-government elements in the community.143 
• [I]nternal security duties under the strict limits imposed in a 
constitutionalist liberal democratic system conflict fundamentally in 
many respects with the professional instincts, traditions and ethos 
of the military.144 
• There is a constant risk that a repressive overreaction or a minor 
error of judgment by the military may trigger further civil violence. 
• [T]he civil power may become over-dependent upon the army’s 
presence, and there may be a consequent lack of urgency in 
preparing the civil police for gradually resuming the internal security 
responsibility.145 
• [P]rolonged internal security duties absorb considerable manpower 
and involve diverting highly trained military technicians from their 
vital external defense role. 146 
 
Regarding the “external” role of the military in combating terrorism, 
Wilkinson discusses some advantages of offensive operations and retaliatory 
strikes conducted by a “major power sorely provoked by terrorism”147 against 
terrorist groups and their sponsor states: 
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• It answers inevitable public and media demands for tough action 
against sponsors/perpetrators. 
• By inflicting heavy costs on the terrorists and/or their sponsors, it 
offers a chance of deterring further attacks and sponsorships. 
• It offers a possibility of converting the deterrence message to a 
wider range of potential attackers/state sponsors internationally. 
• It offers a possibility of inflicting a psychologically damaging blow at 
the enemy leadership which might undermine them or hasten their 
removal from power.148 
 
However, Wilkinson also considers some “grave difficulties” in undertaking 
such operations: 
• In many cases of terrorist attack it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain sufficient high-quality intelligence to determine 
with certainty the identity of the perpetrator responsible for the 
attack. 
• A military attack/reprisal could provoke a wider conflict in which the 
advantages of the originally conceived counter-terrorist blow are 
outweighed by much wider costs. 
• A reprisal which causes the death of innocent civilians carries the 
risk of losing the ‘moral high ground’ and the sympathy of 
international opinion. 
• A military reprisal which is taken unilaterally may not carry the 
support of important allies and may cause added stress and strains 
on alliances. 
• A military reprisal may arouse false expectations among the 
general public of success in defeating terrorism, and lead to 
expectations of similar or intensified military action next time.149 
 
In countering international terrorism domestically, the democratic state 
cannot avoid the dilemmas associated with reconciling effective counterterrorist 
measures with civil rights protection, the democratic process, and the rule of law.  
On the one hand, the government must avoid any significant overreaction, which 
might provoke social tensions caused by restricted civil rights.  On the other 
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hand, ineffective counterterrorist measures might undermine the credibility and 
authority of the government.  In order to maintain this balance, in countering 
terrorism the state should rely primarily on its criminal justice and law-
enforcement institutions.  However, when heavily armed terrorist groups enjoy 
safe havens provided by foreign states, military interventions conducted by 
appropriate forces may be necessary.150 
 
C. NATO’S POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
Philip Gordon considers that the campaign against terrorism “will have 
significant impact on practically every aspect of NATO and the context in which it 
operates – the future of transatlantic solidarity, alliance military structures, 
enlargement, NATO-Russia relations, the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), and NATO’s future organisation, roles and missions.”151  Arguably, all 
these areas have proved to be of significant importance for the Alliance and the 
need for adjustments has become noticeable.   
Transatlantic solidarity was undoubtedly demonstrated after 11 September 
by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and by providing individual and 
collective support to the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism.  However, the U.S. 
decision to reject the option of a NATO-led operation has provoked discussions 
and debates about NATO’s future as a military Alliance and as an effective tool in 
combating terrorism.  The U.S. government’s decision to organize a U.S.-led 
anti-terrorist campaign was probably influenced by the lessons learned in 
Washington from the NATO-led Kosovo air campaign and by the existing (and 
growing) transatlantic capabilities gap. 
NATO’s existing collective military capabilities, including the Immediate 
Reaction Forces, could not be used directly in Operation Enduring Freedom.  
However, the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean, the Standing Naval Forces 
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Atlantic, the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, the Kosovo Force, and the 
Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the efforts of the anti-
terrorist coalition.  NATO’s force structure requires adjustment to the new 
challenges.  In this regard, the allies decided to create the NATO Response 
Force at the Prague Summit in November 2002.  This force, which is to be fully 
operational no later than October 2006, could be an effective tool both for the 
collective defense needs of the allies and for rapid deployments within and 
beyond NATO’s region, including responses to terrorist threats or attacks.  This 
force could also be used for implementing and enforcing decisions of the United 
Nations Security Council. 
Inviting seven more East European countries to join the Alliance in 2004 
could be considered not only as expanding NATO’s zone of influence and 
increasing the level of security in the region, but also as embracing these states 
in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and preventing some of them from 
becoming a source of instability in the future.  The invitations demonstrated the 
Alliance’s confidence in these countries.  The Alliance now expects adequate 
responses from them, related both to improving their military capabilities and 
interoperability and generating stability in the region.  Almost all of the invited 
countries have contributed to the campaign against terrorism in accordance with 
their current capabilities. 
Relations between NATO and Russia also received a new impetus after 
11 September.  Russia, which has internal terrorism problems, contributes 
significantly to the broad anti-terrorist campaign.  The new NATO-Russia Council 
is expected to be a forum for further enhancing cooperation and for coordination 
of common activities in several important areas, including counterterrorism. 
The campaign against terrorism will have at least two implications for the 
EU’s ESDP.  First, in order to have sufficient manpower for the anti-terrorist 
operations, the United States would probably need to withdraw some of its troops 
from the Balkans. This would require the EU members to be prepared to deploy 
their forces earlier than they had expected.  Second, the European allies are 
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expected to significantly improve their military capabilities, especially those 
related to force projection, high-intensity combat, and improved interoperability 
with the U.S forces.152 
In a series of statements, NATO clarified the definition of its future roles 
and missions regarding the fight against terrorism.  On 6 December 2001, the 
NAC reiterated the Alliance’s determination to play an active role in this struggle.  
In this statement the NAC envisaged some important practical measures related 
to NATO’s future roles and missions for combating terrorism: 
Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation can make an 
essential contribution to the fight against terrorism.  We will 
enhance our ability to provide support, when requested, to national 
authorities for the protection of civilian populations against the 
effects of any terrorist attack… We reaffirm our willingness to 
provide assistance, individually or collectively, as appropriate and 
according to our capabilities, to Allies and other states which are or 
may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their 
support for the campaign against terrorism.153 
On 18 December 2001, NATO declared its resolve to adapt its capabilities 
to the new challenges to international security.  However, in this statement the 
allies did not assign the military the primary role among the other possible means 
of countering terrorism: 
[W]e are especially concerned to ensure that the Alliance military 
concepts evolve in keeping with our clear appreciation of the 
menace posed by terrorism.  Such action must of course make use 
of a wide range of national and international means, of which 
military ones are only a part.154 
On 31 January 2002, in response to critics who argued that NATO has no 
role in dealing with the new threats, Lord Robertson stated that “the Alliance is 
                                            
152 Ibid., 98-99. 
153 “NATO's Response to Terrorism.” Statement issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 6 December 2001. NATO Press 
Release M-NAC-2 (2001)159, par. 6-7, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-
159e.htm> (10 September 2002). 
154 “Statement on Combating Terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities,” 
NATO Press Release (2001)173, 18 December 2001, par.2, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm > (10 September 2002). 
55 
becoming the primary means for developing the role of the armed forces to 
defeat the terrorist threat.”155  This does not mean that the Alliance will become a 
primary tool for combating terrorism. It means, however, that NATO will provide 
coordination and a framework for appropriate training of the armed forces for 
possible anti-terrorist tasks. 
On 14 June 2002, Lord Robertson declared some “fundamentally 
important decisions”156 made by the NAC that outline the areas in which NATO 
can contribute most effectively to the fight against terrorism: 
NATO should be ready to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect 
against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad 
against our populations, territory, infrastructure and forces, 
including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour 
them.  Similarly, if requested, we should be ready to provide 
assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences 
of terrorist attacks, particularly where these involve chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear weapons.  We agreed that NATO 
should be ready to deploy its forces ‘as and where required’ to 
carry out such missions.  And we agreed that, following a case-by-
case decision, NATO might provide its assets and capabilities to 
support operations undertaken by or in cooperation with the EU or 
other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies.157 
The NAC also specified the need to develop four critical military 
capabilities: “secure, modern communications and information systems; the 
ability to move forces quickly to where they are needed, and to stay there as long 
as necessary; the means to work together seamlessly, and to win in combat; and 
last but certainly not least, defences against chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear attacks.”158  Developing these capabilities will improve the 
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interoperability between the NATO members and will contribute to diminishing 
the military capabilities gap between the United States and the European allies. 
However, some analysts have expressed reasonable concerns about 
significantly broadening NATO’s roles in combating terrorism: 
The formulation of a broad response to the challenges posed by 
transnational terrorism is beyond NATO’s capabilities or its 
appropriate functions.  The EU and G-8 have developed an 
extensive network of inter-agency cooperation in combating 
transnational crime and subversive organizations; it makes more 
sense to build on that than to extend NATO into an ‘anti-terrorist 
alliance’, as some have suggested in the wake of the attacks on 
New York and Washington.159 
 
The analysis of NATO’s current participation in the campaign against 
terrorism and the assessment of the appropriate role of the military in combating 
terrorism and winning asymmetric conflicts suggest key findings about the future 
possible role of the Alliance in the struggle against international terrorism. 
First, NATO has historically concentrated on defense capabilities relevant 
to its main goal – assuring peace and security in Europe.  Most of the European 
allies do not have significant force projection capabilities and must rely on U.S. 
assets.  The new threats require new responses, including new force structures 
and new capabilities.  However, the new responses also call for new strategies, 
tactics, priorities, training, and resources. 
Second, NATO has developed several mechanisms for reducing the 
threats posed by the huge stockpiles of small armaments and light weapons in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.  It also has politico-military tools 
for reducing the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
through active cooperation with its partners in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
Third, the winning strategy for the strong actor in asymmetric conflict, at 
least in some circumstances, is to apply the same approach as the weak one.  In 
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the case of combating terrorist cells this might mean covert operations, low-
intensity conflicts, surprise raids, and other unconventional methods.  NATO 
forces do not fully meet the requirements for conducting such operations and 
therefore need additional preparation and equipment. 
Fourth, the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies have the main 
responsibility for countering internal threats posed by domestic and/or 
international terrorist organizations.  In principle, the military should be used only 
as the last possible option for restoring public order, or as a military support to 
the civil authorities – for preventing terrorist attacks and/or for dealing with the 
consequences of possible terrorist attacks, including attacks conducted with 
WMD. 
NATO has to adapt itself to the new international security environment; 
otherwise it may become a regional political-military organization with some 
peacekeeping functions.  Currently the military capabilities of most of the allies 
do not allow them to rapidly deploy forces far beyond NATO’s borders.  The 
forces and assets which the allies are ready to contribute are much more 
prepared to participate in peace support operations than in high-intensity combat 
or long-range power projection.  The fact that the United States allotted the 
Alliance a secondary, supportive role during the initial phases of the post-11 
September campaign against terrorism has led the allies to redefine NATO’s 
future role in countering international terrorism.  NATO has a future role in the 
struggle against international terrorism, but it must also continue to support the 
significant non-military efforts to neutralize the terrorist threats. 
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APPENDIX A – THE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY 
WARNING & CONTROL FORCE160 
 
 
In the early 1970s, studies directed by NATO’s major military commanders 
showed that an airborne early warning (AEW) radar system would significantly 
enhance the Alliance’s air defense capability. In December 1978, the Defense 
Planning Committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding to buy and 
operate a NATO-owned AEW system. With this decision the member nations 
embarked on NATO’s largest commonly funded acquisition program. 
 
The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) Force was 
established in January 1980 and granted full NATO Command Headquarters 
status by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee on 17 October 1980. The Force 
Command Headquarters is located with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. While the NAEW&C Force supports two 
major NATO commands – Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) – SHAPE exercises administrative control of the force. 
 
The NAEW&CF mixed force consists of two operational elements 
(Components): the NATO E-3A Component at Geilenkirchen, Germany, with 17 
Boeing NATO E-3A aircraft and a second component, No. 8 (Airborne Early 
Warning) Squadron of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) at Waddington, United 
Kingdom, with 7 Boeing E-3D aircraft. The E-3D Component declared its Initial 
Operating Capability on 1 July 1992, bringing the NAEW Mixed Force Concept to 
reality. 
 
The NATO E-3A Component is represented by 12 nations (Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey and the United States).  The E-3As have been operating from the 
Main Operating Base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, since February 1982. 
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located at Trapani, Italy; Aktion, Greece; 
Konya, Turkey; and a Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Oerland, Norway. 
 
The E-3D Component, No.8 (AEW) Squadron of the RAF, is manned only 
by RAF personnel and its Main Operating Base (MOB) is RAF Waddington in 
Lincolnshire, United Kingdom. 
 
When operating at an altitude of about 30,000 feet, an E-3A aircraft can 
continuously scan more than 312,000 km2 of the earth’s surface. Operating well 
within Western airspace, such aircraft can provide early warning about low-flying 
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intruders into the NATO area as well as high altitude coverage extending deep 
into the territory of a potential aggressor. While the Force’s principal role is air 
surveillance, it provides economical communications support for air operations, 
including counter-air, close air support, rescue, reconnaissance and airlift as well 
as surveillance and control. Aircrews can exchange information with ground- and 
sea-based commanders since the E-3As/E-3Ds can use maritime mode radar to 
detect and monitor enemy shipping. 
 
The AEW radar is able to “look down” and separate moving targets from 
the stationary ground clutter that confuses other radar. It adds the ability to detect 
and track enemy aircraft operating at low altitudes over all terrain and to identify 
and give directions to friendly aircraft operating in the same area. In addition, the 
E-3A’s mobility allows it to be deployed rapidly where it is most needed and 
makes it far less vulnerable to attack than ground-based radars. 
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APPENDIX B – STANDING NAVAL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN161 
 
 
NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) was 
activated on 30 April 1992, when eight Allied naval units started flying the NATO 
flag in Naples, Italy.  STANAVFORMED provides a continuous maritime 
presence and thus is a constant and visible reminder of the solidarity and 
cohesiveness of the Alliance. The inauguration of this long-awaited NATO naval 
force marked an important step in the process initiated with the approval of the 
new NATO Strategic Concept, which calls for a greater role to be played by allied 
multinational forces. 
 
As the natural successor to the NATO Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean 
(NAVOCFORMED) –which had been periodically activated for more than 20 
years – STANAVFORMED is a naval force made up of vessels from various 
allied nations, training and operating together as a collective whole under the 
Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH), currently 
Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte. 
 
Nations normally contributing to the Force are Germany, Greece, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.  Other 
NATO nations have also occasionally contributed.  Composition of the Force 
varies. 
 
Command of the force rotates among participating countries.  The present 
commander is Commodore Philip Wirth, Royal Netherlands Navy, who took 
command on 13 September 2002. 
                                            
161 Standing Naval Force Mediterranean Fact Sheet, available at 
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APPENDIX C – STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC162 
 
 
The Standing Naval Force is a squadron of eight to ten destroyers and 
frigates. Today, the ships are usually attached to the force for up to six months 
on a rotating basis. Units of one nationality do not necessarily relieve units from 
the same nation. To provide continuity, the force commander and his staff are 
appointed on a more permanent basis, with the post of force commander rotating 
annually among the participating countries. 
 
The tours of duty for his multinational staff are for one year. The Chief 
Staff Officer, Operations Officer, Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer, Above Water 
Warfare Officer and Communications Officer are from nations other than the 
commander’s while the staff public affairs officer is from the Commander’s 
nation. These positions rotate over the year to maintain a balance of 
representation among member nations. 
 
In peacetime, the force exercises primarily in the Eastern Atlantic – the 
most probable area of operation. Thus, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
(SACLANT) has operational command of the force, and the Commander-in-Chief 
East Atlantic administers the force on SACLANT’s behalf. SACLANT routinely 
delegates operational control to the area commander where the force is 
operating. 
 
In terms of specific and continuing tasks, STANAVFORLANT spends 
about 60% of its time under way, conducting squadron training exercises, 
cooperating with non-STANAVFORLANT national forces to make the optimum 
use of available training and support facilities. In the course of this work, the 
force participates in major NATO and national exercises at sea and plays an 
important part in the evolution of new NATO naval warfare tactics. Also, the force 
is scheduled to visit various ports, including those of non- NATO countries, to 
show itself as a visible symbol of naval solidarity. Through its various social, 
sporting and community activities during in-port periods STANAVFORLANT 
demonstrates the intangible qualities inherent in multinational co-operation. 
 
Despite the fact that its ships have different capabilities and national roles, 
its officers and crewmembers come from different nations, speak many different 
languages, and follow a variety of customs, STANAVFORLANT has developed 
into an effective integrated squadron with an identity of its own, at sea and 
ashore. The fact that all the ships fly the NATO flag and all the members of each 
ship’s company wear the STANAVFORLANT badge on their uniforms contributes 
to a sense of belonging.                                             
162 Standing Naval Force Atlantic Fact Sheet, available at 
<http://www.eastlant.nato.int/snfl/snfl.htm> (15 February 2003). 
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Any alliance is subject to internal and external strains, but nearly all who 
have been closely connected with STANAVFORLANT see it as a highly effective 
force and nucleus of NATO maritime power. Its continuous presence 
demonstrates the solidarity and vigilance of the NATO Alliance while constantly 
developing multinational maritime skills and tactics.  
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STANAVFORMED (6 October – 07 December 2001) 
1. HMS Chatham, frigate, United Kingdom, (flagship)  
2. FGS Bayern, frigate, Germany 
3. HS Formion, destroyer, Greece 
4. ITS Aliseo, frigate, Italy 
5. HNLMS Van Nes, frigate, The Netherlands 
6. SPS Santa Maria, frigate, Spain 
7. TCG Giresun, frigate, Turkey 
8. USS Elrod, frigate, United States 
STANAVFORLANT (7 December 2001 – 13 January 2002) 
1. NRP Corte Real, frigate, Portugal (flagship)  
2. BNS Wesdiep, frigate, Belgium 
3. HDMS Niels Juel, frigate, Denmark 
4. FGS Karlsruhe, destroyer, Germany 
5. ITS Audace, destroyer, Italy 
6. HNLMS Heemskerck, frigate, The Netherlands 
7. HNMLS Amsterdam, oiler, The Netherlands 
8. HNOMS Narvik, frigate, Norway 
9. SPS Extremadura, frigate, Spain 
10. HMS Exeter, destroyer, United Kingdom 
11. USS Elrod, frigate, United States 
STANAVFORMED (14 January - 14 April 2002) 
1. HMS Chatham, frigate, United Kingdom (Flagship) (14 January - 16 
February 2002)  
2. HMS Sheffield, frigate, United Kingdom (Flagship) (from 16 February 
2002)  
3. USS Elrod, frigate, United States (until 4 March 2002).  
4. FGS Luebeck, frigate, Germany 
5. HS Salamis, frigate, Greece 
6. SPS Baleares, frigate, Spain 
7. ITS Grecale, frigate, Italy 
8. TCG Gokceada, frigate, Turkey 
                                            
163 Source: “Participating Forces of Operation Active Endeavour”, available at 
<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/Endeavour/forces.htm> (15 February 2003). 
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9. HNLMS Witte de With, frigate, The Netherlands 
10. ITS Artigliere, frigate, Italy (from 15 Feb 2002)  
11. HNOMS Uthaug, submarine, Norway 
12. ITS Minerva, frigate, Italy (25 February-13 March 2002)  
STANAVFORLANT (15 April – 8 July 2002) 
1. SPS Canarias, frigate, Spain (Flagship)  
2. HMS Norfolk, frigate, United Kingdom 
3. FGS Luetjens, destroyer, Germany 
4. HNOMS Narvik, frigate, Norway 
5. NRP Vasco da Gama, frigate, Portugal 
6. HDMS Olfert-Fisher, frigate, Denmark 
7. USS Samuel B Roberts, frigate, United States 
8. HNMLS Amsterdam, tanker, The Netherlands 
In addition to STANAVFORLANT, the following units [operated] within 
Task Force Endeavour:  
9. ITS Granatiere, frigate, Italy 
10. HNOMS Uthaug, submarine, Norway (until 1 June 2002).  
STANAVFORMED (9 July 2002 - 16 October 2002) 
1. HMS Chatham, frigate, United Kingdom (Flagship) (13 August - 13 
September 2002)  
2. HNLMS Witte de With, frigate, The Netherlands (Flagship) (from 13 
September 2002)  
3. USS Arthur Wradford, frigate, United States (from 1 September 2002)  
4. FGS Moelders, destroyer, Germany 
5. HS Aegean, frigate, Greece (from 20 August 2002)  
6. SPS Asturias, frigate, Spain (from 1 September 2002)  
7. ITS Perseo, frigate, Italy (until 9 September 02)  
8. ITS Granatiere. frigate, Italy (from 10 September 2002)  
9. TCG Gaziantep, frigate, Turkey (until 10 September 2002)  
10. TCG Gediz, frigate, Turkey (from 11 September 2002)  
11. HMS Edinburgh, destroyer, United Kingdom (from 13 September 2002) 
12. HMS Sheffield, frigate, United Kingdom (Flagship) (9 July - 13 August 
2002)  
13. HS Limnos, frigate, Greece (until 19 Aug 02)  
14. USS Taylor, frigate, United States (until 31 Aug 02)  
15. SPS Andalucia, frigate, Spain (until 31 Aug 02) 
STANAVFORLANT (17 October - 7 December 2002) 
1. SPS Numancia, frigate, Spain (Flagship)  
66 
2. HMS Somerset, frigate, United Kingdom 
3. USS De Wert, frigate, United States 
4. HNOMS Trondheim, frigate, Norway 
5. ITS Artigliere, frigate, Italy 
[A]dditional national contributions to TFE: 
6. HDMS Saelen, submarine, Denmark 
7. TCG Trakya, frigate, Turkey 
8. HS Navarinon, frigate, Greece 
9. TCG Bozcaada, frigate, Turkey 
10. HS Kavaloydis, patrol boat, Greece 
11. HS Vlachavas, patrol boat, Greece 
STANAVFORMED (8 December 2002 - ) 
1. HNLMS Abraham van der Hulst, frigate, The Netherlands (Flagship)  
2. HS Navarinon, frigate, Greece 
3. HS Vlahavas, patrol boat, Greece 
4. TCG Bartin, corvette, Turkey 
5. USS Hawes, frigate, United States 
6. HS Elli, frigate, Greece 
7. SPS Asturias, frigate, Spain 
8. TCG Gelibolu, frigate, Turkey 
9. ITS Scirocco, frigate, Italy 
10. FGS Augsburg, frigate, Germany 
11. TCG Ege, frigate, Turkey 
12. HMS Northumberland, frigate, United Kingdom 
13. HNOMS Utvaer, submarine, Norway 
14. HS Posydon, submarine, Greece 
15. HNOMS Saelen, submarine, Greece [sic] 
16. TCG Zafer, frigate, Turkey 
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